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9. The locus of Keynes's philosophical thinking 
in The General Theory: the concept of 
convention 
John B. Davis 
I have argued elsewhere (Davis, 1989, 1991 a, 1991 b) that the criticisms 
addressed to Keynes's earlier philosophical thinking as initiated by Frank 
Ramsey, together with his own sense of the limitations of his earlier philos-
ophy, led Keynes to reformulate his understanding of the central concept of 
his early philosophy, namely, the concept of intuition. This conclusion fol-
lows from Keynes's later philosophical statements and claims, first in his 
assessment of his early philosophy in 'My Early Beliefs', and second in his 
comments on economic method in letters to Harrod, where Keynes's earlier 
conception of the individual and society is extended and redeveloped to 
include a new emphasis on convention and a new understanding of intuition 
and judgement. On this new view, intuition and judgement are dependent 
upon and function within a system of interdependent belief expectations in 
which individuals find themselves embedded, so that it is no longer sufficient 
to explain the content and character of a particular individual's judgements 
and decisions in terms of a pure, unmediated intuition, but rather necessary to 
account for the manner in which a particular individual's judge~ents reflect 
different individuals' similar or like judgements in similar circumstances. 
These conclusions flow directly from consideration of Keynes's philo-
sophical development. Yet clearly what dominated Keynes's intellectual de-
v~lopment in the years subsequent to his initial concern with philosophy was 
his struggle with the problems of economic theory and policy. This concep-
tual terrain was almost entirely removed from the language and interests of 
his early philosophy, and indeed philosophy in general, so that it cannot be 
said that Keynes's philosophical development was directly focused upon 
matters of philosophical significance, as would have been the case had his 
intellectual career taken the path upon which it had originally embarked. 
Keynes's philosophical development, thus, proceeded at two removes from 
the natural objects and preoccupations of philosophy. It did not make the 
traditional problems of philosophy its primary vehicle, and it also required 
translation from a different set of issues and a different way of thinking that 
occupied an increasing share of his intellectual activity. What this implies is 
that though one can trace the outlines of Keynes's later philosophical devel-
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opment by marking its occasional signposts in his occasional philosophical 
comments, to fully understand this development it is necessary to read off its 
expression in theoretical matters of a quite different nature, namely, Keynes's 
economics. The task of those who seek to explain Keynes's philosophical 
thinking, therefore, is to demonstrate how Keynes resolved problems specifi-
cally in economics as a philosophically self-conscious thinker. Practically 
speaking, this is to explain the philosophical commitments of Keynes's later 
economics in a manner consistent with Keynes's own philosophical interests 
and history of philosophical thinking. Yet as a matter of emphasis, it is not to 
attach Keynes's later economics to his philosophy, as does the most recent 
literature that favours his early views (Carabelli, 1988; O'Donnell, 1989), but 
rather to find out how Keynes's philosophical commitments evolved with his 
economics and largely in their service. 
To proceed on this score is to turn attention to The General Theory. Only 
after an examination of the philosophical dimensions of this work will it 
make sense to further discuss Keynes's later philosophical thinking. As prep-
aration for that larger project, in what follows Keynes's conception of the 
workings of the economy in The General Theory will be set forth, with 
special attention to his emphasis upon the concept of convention. The con-
cept of convention is both central to the argument of The General Theory 
regarding equilibrium unemployment, and was also singled out after the 
publication of The General Theory by Keynes in 'My Early Beliefs', as his 
chief later philosophical concern. Moreover, its elaboration in the locations 
in The General Theory in which the concept appears, bears strong connection 
to Keynes's comments to Harrod about economic method. The discussion 
below first summarizes Keynes's general argument in The General Theory, 
and then turns to an analysis of the role of convention in this argument. 
The argument of The General Theory 
In recent years there have been many good accounts of Keynes's argument in 
The General Theory (e.g., Chick, 1983; Kahn, 1984; Amadeo, 1989; Rogers, 
1989; Asimakopulos, 1991). Keynes himself summarizes his argument in 
Chapter 18, 'The General Theory of Employment Re-stated'. He starts out by 
explicitly identifying the factors that are given, the independent variables, 
and the dependent variables. The 'ultimate independent variables' are: 
(1) the three fundamental psychological factors, namely, the psychological pro-
pensity to consume, the psychological attitude to liquidity and the psychological 
expectation of future yield from capital assets, (2) the wage-unit as determined by 
the bargains reached between employers and employed, and (3) the quantity of 
money as determined by the action of the central bank (Keynes, VII, pp. 246-7). 
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These variables determine at anyone time an economy's national income and 
its quantity of employment, the dependent variables whose explanation is the 
primary object of The General Theory. They are also variables that Keynes 
says are susceptible to influence and in some instances subject to deliberate 
control or management by central authorities to promote full employment 
levels of national income and output. Keynes summarizes his argument as 
follows (Keynes VII, pp. 247-9). 
Focusing upon new investment as the crucial form of expenditure, Keynes 
notes that new investment proceeds to the point at which the supply price of 
each type of capital asset, taken together with its expected yield in the future 
earnings it is likely to generate, makes the marginal efficiency of capital 
equal to the rate of interest. This immediately presupposes states of activity 
for three of the independent variables noted above, the 'psychological expec-
tation of future yield from capital assets', or as Keynes also describes it, the 
'state of confidence' (Keynes VII, p. 248) concerning prospective yields, the 
psychological attitude to liquidity, and the quantity of money as determined 
by the actions of the central bank, which together thus determine the rate of 
new investment. New investment then brings forth new consumption, yet, 
according to the marginal propensity to consume, another of Keynes's inde-
pendent variables, in an increment less than the increment to income stem-
ming from the new investment. The ratio of new investment to additional 
income is termed the investment multiplier; by regarding it as equivalent to 
the associated employment multiplier, the increment to employment attend-
ant upon the new investment can be established. Higher income then raises 
the schedule of liquidity preference by increasing the demand for money, 
which, given the quantity of money as determined by actions of the central 
bank, raises the rate of interest until new investment is halted. . ..... . 
The position of equilibrium, with values for national income and employ-
ment, need not of course be a full employment equilibrium. Indeed, in Key-
nes's view, the capitalist economic system is 'capable of remaining in a 
chronic condition of sub-normal activity for a considerable period without 
any marked tendency either towards recovery or towards complete collapse' 
(Keynes VII, p. 249). This state of affairs derives from the levels achieved by 
the independent variables Keynes isolates, or more specifically, from the 
state of activity exhibited by the psychological propensities or attitudes he 
believes of central importance. But what does it mean to say that a particular 
psychological propensity or attitude, for example, the psychological attitude 
toward liquidity, exhibits a particular state of activity? In determining equi-
librium income and employment this question does not arise, since the levels 
of the independent variables, and the state of activity of each psychological 
propensity, are taken as given for that purpose. Yet The General Theory does 
more than demonstrate that unemployment may exist in equilibrium; it also 
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considers how this state of affairs is tied to the development of a monetary 
economy that has made the psychological propensities Keynes isolates the 
chief determinants of income and employment. From this historical perspec-
tive, the question of how the psychological propensities isolated achieve their 
respective states of activity becomes important. Indeed, Keynes asserted that 
his selection of independent variables was in part motivated by a conviction 
that these particular psychological propensities and attitudes were potentially 
subject to influence by central authorities. More needs to be said, then, about 
the nature of the psychological propensities and attitudes that underlie the 
argument of The General Theory, and more in particular about Keynes's 
philosophical understanding of the concept of a psychological propensity. 
To begin, it helps to emphasize that Keynes's summary view of his argu-
ment, with its focus upon new investment expenditure, gives primary atten-
tion to two of the three 'fundamental' factors he identifies, the psychological 
attitude toward liquidity and psychological attitude toward or state of confi-
dence concerning the future yields from capital assets. These attitudes, it 
should be noted, are also the subject of Keynes's most emphatic statements in 
The General Theory about the conventional character of economic behaviour. 
In his discussion of the incentives to liquidity Keynes asserts, '[i]t might be 
more accurate, perhaps, to say that the rate of interest is a highly conven-
tional, rather than a highly psychological, phenomenon. For its actual value 
is largely governed by the prevailing view as to what its value is expected to 
be' (Keynes VII, p. 203). In discussing long-term investment expectations, 
Keynes states that the valuation of investments cannot be accomplished 
solely through mathematical calculation, but depends upon a convention in 
organized investment markets that 'the existing state of affairs will continue 
indefinitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expeci-a change' 
(Keynes VII, p. 152). The chief psychological propensities at issue in Key-
nes's view of the economy, then, are thought to require explanation in terms 
of the notion of a convention. Keynes's (Chapter 18 summary) view of the 
operation of the capitalist market economy, accordingly, itself needs to be 
understood in this way. How is this to be done? 
In Macroeconomics After Keynes, Victoria Chick asserts that at an import-
ant point in the transition from his thinking in the Treatise on Money to that 
in The General Theory Keynes came 'to the astonishing conclusion that the 
chief cause of unemployment is not so much that the real wage is too high, 
but that the rate of interest is too high' (Chick, 1983, p. 10). That the rate of 
interest could be too high meant for Keynes that the array of empirical, 
psychological, and institutional factors (such as bank policy, lenders' and 
borrowers' attitudes toward risk and liquidity, etc.) which determined the rate 
of interest possessed a configuration relative to the configuration of those 
empirical, psychological, and institutional factors (such as employers' and 
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employees' bargaining strengths, relative wages, etc.) which determined the 
wage-unit that left income and output below full employment levels. Put 
differently, that there existed unemployment was ultimately to be explained 
by the inertial evolution of conventional attitudes and predispositions regard-
ing finance and the labour market that locked the interest rate and the real 
wage in non-market clearing relations to one another. As emphasized by 
Colin Rogers (1989), for Keynes the Wicksellian notion that there exists a 
real or natural, long rate of interest that constitutes the ultimate anchor to 
which all other variables ultimately freely adjust is without foundation and 
intellectually naive. It is market forces, rather, which the historical evidence 
demonstrates are constrained to adjust to conventional non-market, histori-
cally and socially determined institutional arrangements, and it is these, in 
fact, that thus constitute the centre of gravitation for the economic system as 
a whole. Should, then, the demand for liquidity as determined by such forces 
be especially high, it is because of institutional and psychological develop-
ments in the historical evolution of financial markets that, given long-stand-
ing, conventionally established levels for real and relative wages, leave the 
interest rate too high to justify the new investment needed for full employ-
ment. 
Income and employment are then determined by the level of effective 
demand this state of affairs permits. Here Keynes's argument and its view of 
market forces in the labour market is familiar. 
The propensity to consume and the rate of new investment determine between 
them the volume of employment, and the volume of employment is uniquely 
related to a given level of real wages - not the other way round. If1:he propensity 
to consume and the rate of new investment result in a deficient effective demand, 
the actual level of employment will fall short of the supply of labor potentially 
available at the existing real wage, and the equilibrium real wage will be greater 
than the marginal disutility of the equilibrium level of employment (Keynes VII, 
p.30). 
The principle of effective demand, by way of the dependence of investment 
upon conventional attitudes toward liquidity and prospective yield, is thus in 
significant degree detached from the logic of market forces. Indeed, when 
entrepreneurs determine their offers of employment in light of their (short-
term) expectations of sales and earnings, they put aside concern with the 
effects of possible wage changes on desired output, and focus their primary 
concern simply upon the level of expected sales. Relatedly, from the perspec-
tive of the economy as a whole, Keynes often emphasized that any economy-
wide wage deflation might well negatively affect effective demand. In com-
bination, then, the attitude toward liquidity, with its effect on the interest rate, 
and the attitude toward prospective yields, with its impact on long-term 
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expectations, jointly serve to determine income and employment, and both 
behaviours, clearly, are for Keynes pre-eminently conventional in nature. 
That Keynes's argument in The General Theory takes this form is not 
always well appreciated. No doubt this is partly due to the fact that the short-
period equilibrium focus of the book makes investigation of the further 
determinants of the argument's independent variables, or what might explain 
the states of activity the different psychological propensities and attitudes 
exhibit, a less immediate objective. But surely also important is the fact that 
this latter investigation is largely an historical-social one that lacks the well-
defined, formal character of the income determination argument. As Keynes 
emphasized to Harrod, economics is an art or way of thinking that makes 
unusual demands upon the economist, and '[g]ood economists are scarce, 
because the gift for using "vigilant observation" to choose good models, 
although it does not require a highly specialised intellectual technique, ap-
pears to be a very rare one' (Keynes XIV, p. 297). Here, the successful 
exercise of this 'art or way of thinking' is taken to require a deeper under-
standing of the psychological attitudes and propensities Keynes believes 
central to the determination of income and employment, and 'vigilant obser-
vation' in choosing such models to depend upon grasping the precise role 
that conventions play in establishing the state of activity of these attitudes 
and propensities. More can be understood about Keynes's own thinking in 
this regard by turning to own analysis of average expectation and the struc-
ture of convention. 
Convention and average expectation in Keynes's argument 
For Keynes, conventions are responsible for determining the general level or 
state of activity displayed by the psychological propensities and attitudes at 
work in the economy. Yet psychological propensities and attitudes manifest 
themselves in varying degrees in different individuals, and thus it is more 
useful and more informative to say that Keynes's interest in conventions was 
ultimately directed toward explaining how conventions act to structure differ-
ent individuals' psychological propensities and attitudes in relation to one 
another - alternatively how conventions relate the degrees to which psycho-
logical propensities and attitudes operate across different individuals. This is 
borne out most clearly in Keynes's often-cited Chapter 12 explanation of the 
role convention assumes in determining long~term investment expectations. 
It can readily be seen, however, that Keynes's analysis there is quite general, 
and as such:, applies in similar fashion to his treatments of the differences 
between individuals regarding the attitude toward liquidity, the propensity to 
consume, relative wages, and entrepreneurial behaviour in the short-period. 
How, then, does Keynes understand convention in his account of long-term 
expectations? 
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Perhaps this question is best approached by first asking why it should be 
the case that the convention governing investment valuation - 'that the exist-
ing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, except in so far as we have 
specific reasons to expect a change' (Keynes VII, p. 152) - assumes the form 
that Keynes says it does. Why is it the case, that is, that organized investment 
markets tend to preserve the status quo - 'the existing state of affairs' - rather 
than, say, constantly challenge it? Keynes's characterization of the conven-
tion that operates in investment markets has as its background a number of 
important statements he makes regarding the origins of speculative activity in 
equity markets and stock exchanges. Chief among these is his statement that 
at the end of the nineteenth century, capital markets were not nearly so highly 
developed as they came to be in the first decades of the twentieth century 
when there emerged a significant separation between ownership and manage-
ment in the typical business firm. Prior to that separation - when 'enterprises 
were mainly owned by those who undertook them or by their friends and 
associates' (Keynes VII, p. 150) - close involvement with the affairs of a 
business, and with the fundamentals of its operations, typically meant a 
steady commitment to that firm's growth. 'Decisions to invest in private 
business of the old-fashioned type were [ ... ] decisions largely irrevocable, 
not only for the community as a whole, but also for the individual' (Keynes 
VII, p. 150). This decentralized, atomistic world of business, in which indi-
viduals had little interaction with one another in regard to decisions to invest 
and grow, was largely displaced by the emergence of a more mobile and 
versatile form of capital ownership, which permitted the daily transfer of 
wealth from one investment to another, and which threw investors together 
on centralized stock exchanges in their common pursuit of speculative gains. 
In this change in the site and character of investment activity, investors lost 
both their former isolation from one another, and their former hands-on 
knowledge of the operations of business. They gained the opportunity to 
daily compare their judgements and those of others, so that the modern 
investment process made investors far more interdependent, though at the 
same time less well acquainted by past standards with those considerations 
specific to particular firms' investment strategies. 
In these circumstances, Keynes tells us, what constituted a good or bad 
investment came to be 'governed by the average expectation of those who 
deal on the Stock Exchange as revealed by the price of shares, rather than by 
the genuine expectations of the professional entrepreneur' (Keynes VII, p. 
151). While onemight be tempted to think that the reference to good or bad 
investment implies that the 'energies and skill of the professional investor 
and speculator' are to be largely devoted to acquiring a better knowledge 
than widely available, so as to permit 'superior long-term forecasts of the 
probable yield of an investment over its whole life', in Keynes's view the 
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investor's 'energies and skill' are rather almost entirely devoted to 'foresee-
ing changes in the conventional basis of valuation a short time ahead of the 
general public' (Keynes VII, p. 154). Thus, while 'the social object of skilled 
investment should be to defeat the dark forces of time and ignorance which 
envelop our future ( ... J the actual, private object of the most skilled invest-
ment to-day is "to beat the gun", as the Americans so well express it, to 
outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-crown to the other 
fellow' (Keynes VII, p. 155). Average expectation regarding the worth of 
various investments is thus not only removed from an informed acquaintance 
with the underlying facts relevant to those investments, but really represents 
no more than an average opinion of their worth - or, more accurately, Keynes 
asserts, an opinion of 'what average opinion expects average opinion to be' 
(Keynes VII, p. 156). ' 
Nonetheless, in such circumstance, or 'under the influence of a mass 
psychology' as not surprisingly develops when average opinion seeks to 
determine average opinion, the professional investor's 'behaviour is not the 
outcome of a wrong-headed propensity', but rather the inevitable 'result of 
an investment market organised along the lines described' (Keynes VII, p. 
155). This average expectation of an investment's prospective yield, of course, 
subsumes different individual expectations of prospective yields both above 
and below that average. Different individuals accordingly have different 
views of the value of any given investment, and their taking action in regard 
to any particular investment opportunity depends upon their recognizing how 
their particular expectations differ from the average. Different individuals 
might thus be said to position themselves in investment markets relative to 
average opinion in those markets, though, despite the importance of this 
distribution for the daily play of trade between different investors, in the final 
analysis it is average expectation - and end-of-the-day mean result of any 
given distribution of individual investors acting upon their different, particu-
lar expectations - that is always visible to investors en masse in the form of 
the final price that clears the market. 
The historical background to Keynes's treatment of convention, then, em-
phasizes the role of average expectation as a force in determining long-term 
expectations. How are the 'daily, even hourly, revaluations of existing invest-
ments carried out in practice? In practice, we have tacitly agreed, as a rule, to 
fall back on what is, in truth a convention. The essence of this convention 
[ ... J lies in assuming that the existing state of affairs will continue indefi-
nitely, except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change' 
(Keynes VII, p. 151-2). More accurately, the convention in place regarding 
investment behaviour is that average expectation is fairly taken to be correct, 
except in so far as particular individuals find their own special circumstances 
give them reason to think otherwise. Alternatively, any standing or broadly 
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accepted interpretation of the existing state of affairs is correct as represent-
ing the best, general knowledge or understanding available, and incorrect to 
the extent that particular individuals have special knowledge associated with 
their own individual circumstances which justifies their thinking otherwise. 
Put in these terms, a convention effectively combines two different forms of 
knowledge - general and individual - both of which individuals utilize to 
plan their different courses of action. 
These two sorts of knowledge conventions deserve further comment. The 
general sort of knowledge or understanding that average expectation repre-
sents acquires its credibility from the fact that, because investors are less and 
less able to interpret the fundamentals of firms' operations, a knowledge of 
these firms' average performance gains in relative importance. The weakness 
of this sort of knowledge or understanding is that, as but a summary form of 
thinking, average expectation naturally subsumes a variety of individual 
opinions, some of which, no doubt, represent a more accurate estimation of 
the value of various investments. In contrast, the sort of understanding the 
special knowledge particular individuals often possess has as its strength the 
greater possibility of being better founded on the true determinants of an 
investment's value. The weakness of this sort of knowledge or understanding 
derives from the fact that, with the separation of ownership and management, 
this sort of individual knowledge or understanding is still deficient by com-
parison with the standard of close, in-house acquaintance with firm opera-
tions that explained individual knowledge before the modern separation of 
ownership and management. 
Despite their comparative disadvantages - or better, precisely because of 
them - these two sets of counterbalancing considerations together dictate the 
way in which the conventional valuation of investments is established. Thus, 
on the one hand, we recognize that average expectation is ever-changing, and 
accordingly do not 'really believe that the existing state of affairs will con-
tinue indefinitely. We know from extensive experience that this is most 
unlikely' (Keynes VII, p. 152), and this reminds us that average expectation 
at best approximates a good knowledge of an investment's worth. At the 
same time, nonetheless, 
We are assuming, in effect, that the existing market valuation, however arrived at, 
is uniquely correct in relation to our existing knowledge of the facts which will 
influence the yield of investment, and that it will only change in proportion to 
changes in this knowledge; though, philosophically speaking, it cannot be uniquely 
correct, since our existing knowledge does not provide a sufficient basis for a 
calculated mathematical expectation. (Keynes VII, p. 152) 
That is, average expectation is still fairly taken to be 'correct' - despite its 
evident deficiency - on account of the fact that that standard by which it 
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might be discounted, namely, 'calculated mathematical expectation', is not 
typically available to us on 'our existing knowledge'. Indeed, a 'calculated 
mathematical expectation', were it to be possible or appropriate, would at the 
very least reflect an individual knowledge of the specific facts surrounding a 
particular investment. Yet since the separation of ownership and manage-
ment, the in-house acquaintance with firm operations necessary for this knowl-
edge and such a calculation rarely exists for most investors. Ironically, with 
this separation, the method of mathematical expectation gains in reputation 
with investors who, now distant from particular facts in their firm-specific 
contexts, seek a technique of judging the significance of collections of the 
various facts available to them that will improve on average expectation. As a 
result of this overall state of affairs, investment valuation becomes the prod-
uct of an uneasy balance between an average expectation that is invariably 
wrong yet accepted and each individual's specific judgements which lack 
firm foundation yet offer at least the promise of doing better than average 
thinking. It is this combination that makes it necessary to regard a convention 
as a structure of expectations, a structure, it should still be emphasized, that is 
always rooted in a specific historical setting. 
A conventional valuation of investments - indeed convention generally in 
The General Theory it can be argued - is thus constituted out of a structure of 
diverse opinion that bears a complex relationship to average opinion as its 
central reference. In this structure, it is the significance of average expecta-
tion as a central reference that explains why conventions favour the status 
quo. More will be said about the nature of the complex relationship between 
average and individual expectation that produces this result in the following 
section in regard to investment valuation. Here it should be emphas!zed that a 
convention in the sense set out here is a form of practical interaction that 
exercises a regulative effect on individuals via their recognition of the signifi-
cance of average opinion, while at the same time accommodating action that 
departs from this central reference. Such a structure is normative in the most 
general sense in that it imposes an orientation upon individual behaviour 
without at the same time making that orientation binding. This is reflected in 
the fact that the content of ruling conventions typically change over time. 
What a particular investment is worth may generally be agreed upon to be 
one thing on one occasion, and yet generally agreed upon on another occa-
sion to be something quite different. Convention seen from this perspective is 
a dynamic structure; in essence, the competing rationales that average and 
individual expectation offer guarantee regular change in the content of any 
convention, and this places a considerable premium upon 'vigilant observa-
tion' as central to the economist's craft. 
Keynes of course addressed the important topic of the dynamics conven-
tions exhibit in regard to the issue of their stability and precariousness. 
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Fundamental in this is his emphasis on the role played by the state of confi-
dence, which, with the decline in 'the element of real knowledge in the 
valuation of investments' attendant upon the separation of ownership and 
management (Keynes VII, p. 153), emerges as a factor 'to which practical 
men always pay the closest and most anxious attention' (Keynes VII, p. 148). 
In these circumstances, ephemeral and insignificant matters often disturb an 
investment community's attachment to the notion that average opinion genu-
inely represents a reasonable valuation of a particular investment. That is, 
confidence emerges as significant with the very emergence of average expec-
tation as a central reference in investment valuation. Thus, as it is increas-
ingly average opinion seeking average opinion that characterizes such mar-
kets, a 'conventional valuation [ ... J established as the outcome of the mass 
psychology of a large number of ignorant individuals is liable to change 
violently as the result of a sudden fluctuation of opinion due to factors which 
do not really make much difference to the prospective yield' (Keynes VII, p. 
154). In this ever more insubstantial world, even the more skilled individual, 
'who, unperturbed by the prevailing pastime, continues to purchase invest-
ments on the best genuine long-term expectations he can frame' (Keynes VII, 
p. 156), is likely to be a casualty of the general change in character of the 
modern investment process, which more and more makes for the outsider 
'[iJnvestrnent based on genuine long-term expectation [ ... J so difficult to-day 
as to be scarcely practicable' (Keynes VII, p. 157). 
The state of confidence regarding any given investment option, then, is not 
impressive by comparison with the full play and expression of animal spirits 
that characterized the past era of enterprise. Though entrepreneurs in the past 
undoubtedly also acted on the assumption that what obtained iu'-the pasL\Vas 
an important guide for their decisions about the future, this was 'business as a 
way of life' (Keynes VII, p. 150), where life in business was embedded in 
lifelong commitments to particular firms. Average expectation lacked mean-
ing in this historical context, so that the state of confidence also lacked 
significance. In short, investment markets assume a different complexion as 
speculation and the pursuit of short-term gain come to dominate both enter-
prise and the long-term project of forecasting the prospective yields of assets. 
Perhaps this is nowhere more sharply expressed by Keynes than in his com-
parison of the investment process and a newspaper beauty contest. 
[P]rofessional investment may be likened to those newspaper competitions in 
which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces- from a hundred 
photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly 
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole; so that each 
competitor has to pick, not those faces which he himself finds prettiest, but those 
which he himself thinks likeliest to catch the fancy of the other competitors, all of 
whom are looking at the problem from the same point of view. It is not a case of 
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choosing those which, to the best of one's judgment, are really the prettiest, nor 
even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached 
the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average 
opinion expects average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who prac-
tice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees. (Keynes VII, p. 156) 
The professional investor neither asks what might be intrinsically the 'pretti-
est' or best investment, nor even what average opinion will take to be the 
'prettiest' or best investment, but rather what other investors believe other 
investors believe to be the 'prettiest' or best investment. In these circum-
stances, investors' expectations display a flimsy attachment to their central 
reference in average expectation - the necessary, though hardly all-dominat-
ing moment in a structure of interdependent beliefs regarding good invest-
ments. In such circumstances, the state of confidence is inevitably a changing 
phenomenon, and long-term investment commitments are often and easily 
abandoned, with the result that the level of investment is generally lower than 
would likely be the case were the spirit of enterprise more dominant. 
Given, then, that '[t]hese tendencies are a scarcely avoidable outcome of 
our having successfully organised 'liquid' investment markets' (Keynes VII, 
p. 159), Keynes concludes that the modern world faces a dilemma. 
The spectacle of modern investment markets has sometimes moved me towards 
the conclusion that to make the purchase of an investment permanent and 
indissoluble, like marriage, except by reason of death or other grave cause, 
might be a useful remedy for our contemporary evils [ ... J But a little considera-
tion of this expedient brings us up against a dilemma, and shows us how the 
liquidity of investment markets often facilitates, though it sometimes impedes, 
the course of new investment. For the fact that each individual investor flatters 
himself that his commitment is 'liquid' ... calms his nerves and makes him 
much more willing to run a risk. If individual purchases of investments were 
rendered illiquid, this might seriously impede new investment, so long as alter-
native ways in which to hold his savings are available. This is the dilemma. So 
long as it is open to the individual to employ his wealth in hoarding or lending 
money, the alternative of purchasing actual capital assets cannot be rendered 
sufficiently attractive. (Keynes VII, p. 160) 
The liquid character of investment markets enhances investment actIvIty, 
while the availability of money investments that are comparatively attractive 
hampers it. It is true, as Richard Kahn has noted (1984), that Keynes's 
account here does not clearly distinguish between decisions regarding real 
capital formation and decisions taken on stock exchanges, so that there is 
some ambiguity in his thinking concerning just how decisions made in the 
latter case come to affect decisions made in the former. Keynes's general 
view, nonetheless, is clear. The increasing importance of speculative activity 
pursuant upon the historic separation of ownership and management had, and 
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was likely to continue to have, decidedly negative effects on the level of 
investment expenditure~ 
This could well be seen as being a matter of the diminished role remaining 
in economic life for the full play and exercise of 'animal spirits', that 'spon-
taneous urge to action rather than inaction' (Keynes VII, p. 161) that was 
more fully in evidence in that earlier period when business enterprise was 
more dominant. Speculation, in contrast, with its greater emphasis upon the 
immediate, foreseeable return, places heavy weight upon the estimation of 
probable gain. Yet because the consequences of so many of the long-term 
projects business contemplates are fundamentally uncertain - as Keynes puts 
it, really no clearer at the outset in their ultimate upshot than 'an expedition 
to the South Pole' (Keynes VII, p. 162) - the occasions available for 'calcu-
lated mathematical expectation' are rare, so that the increasing role for specu-
lation changes the character of the investment process for the worse. Long-
term investment, where uncertainty about the future is inescapable, makes it 
clear that 'individual initiative will only be adequate when reasonable calcu-
lation is supplemented and supported by animal spirits' (Keynes VII, p. 162) 
and the 'spontaneous optimism' (Keynes VII, p. 161) they manifest. 
From this perspective, chronic unemployment results from the interest rate 
being too high, because the short-term gains available to those whose wealth is 
ready and liquid sustains a demand for money that keeps interest rates high 
relative to the marginal efficiency of capital and investor animal spirits. Inthis 
conception, interdependent expectations are formed around both long-term 
investment and around the long rate of interest. Clearly in Keynes's thinking 
these two sets of expectations are related, since individuals with investible 
wealth may substitute between financial and real investment. Keynes nonethe-
less treats the two underlying psychological attitudes involved, that toward 
liquidity and that toward prospective yield, as separate independent variables, 
and consequently founds his equilibrium income determination analysis upon 
the interaction of these two sets of interdependent expectations through the 
income adjustment process. This must be regarded as a concession to the need 
to define the income model in determinate terms, since any collapsing of these 
two independent variables would render Keynes's insight regarding the too-
high level of the interest rate difficult to explain. Yet from the deeper perspec-
tive involved in investigating the social-historical determinants of these inde-
pendent variables - that investigation which has been initiated here in an 
explication of the levels of activity of these psychological attitudes via their 
constitution in conventional structures of interdependent activity - it will ulti-
mately not be possible to avoid treating the linkage between financial and real 
investment and their associated systems of interdependent expectation. 
What role, then, does convention play in Keynes's income and employ-
ment analysis? We have seen that investors' attitudes toward prospective 
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yields are structured around average expectation so as to tend to sustain the 
past valuation of investments, albeit given the forces for change embodied in 
individual expectations. The level and volume of this investment, however, is 
influenced by the level of the rate of interest, which is also conventionally 
determined for Keynes. Attitudes toward liquidity should also be seen to be 
structured around an average expectation of the interest rate, much as atti-
tudes toward prospective yields on investments are structured around their 
average expectation. In the case of the interest rate, 'its actual value is largely 
governed by the prevailing view as to what its value is expected to be. Any 
level of interest which is accepted with sufficient conviction as likely to be 
durable will be durable; subject, of course, in a changing society to fluctua-
tions for all kinds of reasons round the expected normal' (Keynes VII, p. 
203). Any particular interest rate, that is, reveals a balance of expectations 
across individuals with different views of the value of money, a balance 
which manifests itself in an average, central reference value in terms of 
which individuals form their respective expectations regarding the value of 
money. The reigning interest rate, accordingly, is conventional in that it is 
expected to obtain unless there are reasons to expect otherwise. And like 
investment expectations, the average expectation of the interest rate 'is not 
rooted in secure knowledge', is not rooted in any objective understanding of 
the true value of money, and thus 'may fluctuate for decades about a level 
which is chronically too high for full employment' (Keynes VII, p; 204). 
Keynes's general conception of the economy, thus, is one in which these 
two fundamental sets of psychological attitudes, the attitude toward prospec-
tive yields and the attitude toward liquidity, are structured as dynamic, inter-
active systems of interdependent belief. In each case, an average expectation, 
though changeable in content, reigns as a conventional, central reterencefor 
the range of particular expectations different individuals form regarding pro-
spective yields or future interest rates respectively. The state of average 
expectation in the money market relative to the state of average expectation 
regarding future yields determines the interest rate relative to the determina-
tion of firms' investment demand schedules, and jointly they determine the 
level of effective demand, income, and employment. Should the actual con-
tents of these two conventions change relative to one another, then demand, 
income, and employment will change. A condition of chronic unemployment, 
further, is the result of a particular balance between these two, key sets of 
psychological attitudes in particular circumstances at a particular point in 
history. Specifically, the manner in which individuals' psychological atti-
tudes are structured in recent experience is such that the desire for liquidity is 
strong relative to the confidence in prospective yields. A full explanation of 
the existence of chronic unemployment, therefore, incorporates an historical-
institutional analysis of the structuring of these two, key sets of psychologi-
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cal attitudes to account for the particular balance these two, conventional 
systems of interdependent beliefs have attained in modern economies. 
Keynes's underlying vision in The General Theory, then, partakes of both 
insights into the social-psychological dimensions of the economy and sensi-
tivity to the evolving historical framework of the economy. In the first con-
nection he develops an analysis of those psychological attitudes central to the 
understanding of monetary economies that explains economic outcomes in 
terms of a systematic organization of the beliefs and choices that derive from 
these attitudes. In his attention to the structure of interdependence these 
beliefs assume, he further characterizes a formal connection between these 
beliefs and attitudes that has the specific advantage of being determinate yet 
open-ended. That a convention reigns is explained by the significance a 
perceived average expectation possesses. Yet that average expectation can 
assume any content means that the logic of average expectation can accom-
modate an historically diverse experience. Convention, for Keynes, is thus a 
formal yet instantiable concept, and this is crucial to the incorporation of his 
historical insights, the latter dimension to his particular vision. On this score, 
it cannot be too much emphasized that Keynes's historical diagnosis regard-
ing the shift from enterprise to speculation is crucial to his overall project of 
explaining unemployment. It is crucial in that, on the one hand, it enables 
him to say how chronic unemployment came about, and on the other hand, it 
creates opportunities for investigating unemployment's potential remedies. 
Convention as a structure of interdependent expectations 
More needs to be said, however, about Keynes's emphasis upon the nature of 
interdependent expectations to explain his later philosophical thinking, and 
here the attention needs to be directed to the issue of just how individllals 
come to form their particular expectations. Recall that when writing to Harrod 
about the nature of economics as a moral science after completing The 
General Theory, Keynes had also emphasized that the subject matter of 
economics is neither 'constant' nor 'homogeneous', and that this is due to the 
fact that it dealt with individuals' 'motives, expectations, [and] psychological 
uncertainties' (Keynes XIV, p. 300). We now see that he might well have 
added that individuals' 'motives, expectations, [and] psychological uncer-
tainties' are variegated and diverse, and that this stems from the fact that 
individuals invariably find themselves in very different circumstances when 
it comes to such things as their respective views regarding the prospective 
yields on various investments and perceptions of the relative desirability of 
holding money. It is interesting that this point did receive special attention in 
The General Theory discussion of 'bulls' and 'bears' in the money market (a 
treatment which recalled a similar analysis in the Treatise on Money), and 
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that Keynes thought this analogous to his account of long-term expectations 
and the marginal efficiency of capital. 
Just as we found that the marginal efficiency of capital is fixed, not by the 'best' 
opinion, but by the market valuation as determined by mass psychology, so also 
expectations as to the future of the rate of interest as fixed by mass psychology 
have their reactions on liquidity-preference; - but with this addition that the 
individual, who believes that future rates of interest will be above the rates 
assumed by the market, has a reason for keeping actual liquid cash [ ... J whilst the 
individual who differs from the market in the other direction will have a motive 
for borrowing money for short periods in order to purchase debts of longer term. 
The market price will be fixed at the point at which the sales of the 'bears' and the 
purchases of the 'bulls' are balanced (Keynes XIV, p. 170). 
A structure of individual expectations, then, not only has average expectation 
as its central reference, but also, as this passage emphasizes, somehow achieves 
a balance between divergent individual expectations. This particular empha-
sis, which gives less weight to the gravitational aspects of average expecta-
tion as a central reference, invites us to further investigate the principles that 
govern the distribution of individual expectations about the mean. Clearly, in 
a market system these principles will go beyond the simple arithmetical 
concept of a mean, since average expectation, as a reigning value in a single 
price market, emerges from a non-arithmetical market logic of offers and 
counter-offers. This proposition is perhaps best examined by thus taking a 
closer look at individual expectation in relation to average expectation. 
Following the treatment above, it will be helpful to retain the focus upon 
investors' attitudes toward prospective yields. In the equity market, the aver-
age expectation of a particular stock's value emerges from a trading process 
between buyers and sellers of that stock. Different traders' initial offers to 
buy and sell a stock range over a variety of values, and bargaining between 
them each day brings about a market-clearing exchange at a single value that 
involves adjustment in asking price on the part of some and entry to and exit 
from the market on the part of others. The average expectation of a particular 
stock's value in this sense subsumes a variety of individual views regarding 
that stock's potential value on the part of the market's participants. As the 
quoted price or reigning value, it constitutes a central reference for buyers 
and sellers, both because, as already noted, it reflects the collective wisdom 
of the market regarding the value of any particular stock, yet also because it 
represents a point of departure for offers to buy and sell at the start of each 
successive trading day. On this analysis, average expectation is more than 
simply a mean value of individual offers, since it represents the outcome of 
individuals' dealings with one another in light of the daily re-determination 
of a reigning value. 
Keynes's philosophical thinking 173 
The convention that 'the existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely, 
except in so far as we have specific reasons to expect a change' thus means 
different things to different individuals according to their different perspec-
tives on how they believe average expectation is likely to change. When 
individuals have 'specific reasons to expect a change' in average expectation 
based on their own particular circumstances, views, and information, they act 
upon those 'reasons' in making offers to buy and sell stocks, and in the 
process help to determine a new average expectation of these stocks' values. 
In this, individuals most definitely hope that it will not be the case that 'the 
existing state of affairs will continue indefinitely', since they optimistically 
believe that their particular, special perspective on the market will put them 
in a position 'to outwit the crowd, and to pass the bad, or depreciating, half-
crown to the other fellow' (Keynes XIV, p. 155). Individuals, that is, are 
principally interested in changes in average expectation, just because they 
believe that the individual insight embodied in their individual expectations 
is superior to the collective wisdom represented by average expectation. 
How is it the case, however, that individual traders judge as justified offers 
that depart from average expectation which they and others make, when the 
collective wisdom average expectation embodies must always weigh against 
an individual buyer or seller entertaining an expectation different from the 
average? That an individual hopes 'to outwit the crowd' hardly implies he or 
she can do so. Yet individual traders invariably look upon the reigning price 
produced by average expectation as a point of departure in the pursuit of 
gain. Individual expectation must, then, have its own ground of legitimacy. 
Of course, entertaining the expectation of a stock's value different from its 
reigning value generally depends upon being in the possession of some 
special information or view not widely distributed among those in the mar-
ket. The distribution of individual expectations about the average is thus in 
the first instance a function of the differential possession of information or 
knowledge about the market on the part of different individuals. Being in 
such possession, while nonetheless necessary, is not sufficient to explain how 
individuals judge offers departing from average expectation as justified, since 
information or views not widely distributed must for that very reason also 
appear suspect relative to the consensus understanding represented by aver-
age expectation. Indeed, since average expectation already comprehends dif-
ferential or unevenly distributed information and views, being in the posses-
sion of special information cannot by itself provide sufficient incentive for 
making offers thafdepart from average expectation. 
Keynes, however, provides an additional explanation for the distribution of 
individual expectations around average expectation. In his account of the 
development of speculation and the decline of enterprise, he argues that the 
professional investor comes less and less to be concerned with the underlying 
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fundamentals of an investment, and more and more with anticipating the 
psychology of the market surrounding that investment. Indeed in his meta-
phor of the newspaper beauty contest, the goal of the professional investor is 
not merely to estimate average opinion, but rather to estimate 'what average 
opinion expects the average opinion to be' (Keynes XIV, p. 156). From this 
perspective, investors judge the desirability of offers to buy and sell that 
depart from average expectation according to their views of the psychology 
of the market regarding average opinion. In the context of the discussion 
here, transactions between particular traders turn upon these individuals' 
mutual opinions of each other's individual expectations - in effect, their 
opinions of each other's psychology - since it is these individual expecta-
tions that embody views of what average opinion is likely to be. This implies 
that when individual traders actually go ahead to complete transactions with 
one another at prices that depart from reigning values, they share a confi-
dence in the justifiability of such transactions that itself adds to their prior 
reasons for effecting it based on special information or knowledge. Confi-
dence, then, specifically a confidence distributed and shared differentially 
across potential traders, is Keynes's additional condition for explaining ob-
served trading behaviour. 
This notion of a shared confidence, it should be noted, is linked to Key-
nes's discussion of introspection and value judgements as methods employed 
in economics understood as a moral science. Previously (1991b) I have 
argued that these methods Keynes believes important for economic science 
are equally at the disposal of individuals in the economy. Transposing Key-
nes's views on economic method to the behavior of economic agents implies 
that individuals form interdependent beliefs expectations when they recipro-
cally consult their own cases to judge the likely opinions of others -by analogy 
with their own. In The General Theory, Keynes's reference to 'what average 
opinion expects the average opinion to be' displays a preoccupation with 
essentially just this same sort of interdependence. Professional investors 
consider offers to buy and sell that depart from quoted prices, and in impor-
tant degree determine the desirability of acting upon those offers according to 
the perceived interest and willingness of those with whom they transact to do 
so as well. From the moral science emphasis on introspection and analogical 
reasoning process, each individual trader attempts to ascertain the motives of 
those with whom he or she would transact by a consideration of what his or 
her own motives would be in a like situation. If the imputed motives and 
reasoning appear defensible, trade at a price away from the reigning or 
quoted price begins to acquire a plausibility that supplements a trader's own 
original rationale for considering such a price based on differential informa-
tion. That this process of evaluation occurs reciprocally adds further potential 
support to possible transactions between traders, both in that two traders 
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rather than one may compare initial own reasoning with the reasoning of 
another, and in that each may also take the other's opinion of his or her own 
reasoning as further validation of that initial reasoning. This sort of interde-
pendent reasoning and formation of individual expectations, therefore, al-
lows for the possibility that individual traders may supplement their differen-
tial possession of information with a sufficient degree of shared confidence 
that enables them to resist the pull of average expectation. 
How, then, does this reciprocal interaction of judgements actually occur? 
Each individual attempts to understand the thinking of the other by reference 
to what he or she imagines would be his or her own thinking in the other's 
place. Yet each trader is also aware that just as he or she is attempting to 
replicate the reasoning of another, so the other is simultaneously attempting 
to do the same. This means that to properly understand the thinking of the 
other each must also attempt to replicate the other's attempt at replication, so 
that, in addition to estimating the other's reasoning, each must also estimate 
how his or her own reasoning appears to the other. Higher-order replications 
may be imagined, but they do not add materially to the basic conception of 
interdependence at hand. On this conception, interdependent decision-mak-
ing contexts are essentially much like what a more recent literature explains 
as game-theoretic coordination problems (e.g., Lewis, 1969). In this frame-
work individuals making independent yet interdependent decisions are said 
to be capable of co-ordinating their separate and conflicting objectives (here, 
traders' different goals in buying and selling to one another) by arriving at a 
system of concordant mutual expectations of first and higher orders regarding 
each other's aims and thinking. They are, however, only potentially able to 
do so, since the dominance of individual interest and perspective implicitJn 
the notion of an interaction between separate individuals makes co-ordina-
tion failures the general premisse of the analysis. As for Keynes, then, the 
principal issue that confronts this more modern literature concerns specifica-
tion of those conditions that make such co-ordination possible. 
In the game theoretic literature, this issue is sometimes characterized in 
terms of the idea of salient solutions (Schelling, 1960). If difficulty in com-
munication constitutes an obstacle forestalling co-ordination of independent 
plans, individuals may avail themselves of co-ordination equilibria that stand 
out from other courses of action in virtue of their conspicuousness. The 
salient or conspicuous solution need not be uniquely good or have any other 
particularly remarkable characteristics. It need only be something that en-
ables interacting individuals to expect each other to expect each other to 
detect some particular solution to their coordination problem. Precedent, in 
particular, counts as an important source of salience and means of achieving 
co-ordination. Individuals possessing a similar experience with some particu-
lar regularity similarly extrapolate this regularity into the future to hit upon a 
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means of co-ordinating their respective actions and separate intentions. In the 
broadest sense, a precedent is only some past, commonly recognized pattern, 
external to the immediate interaction of individuals, that guides their indi-
vidual expectations. Precedents may thus be institutionally embedded or 
merely shared perceptions. 
Put in this light, the special attention Keynes devotes in The General 
Theory to the state of confidence indicates less a concern that investors 
lacked the will or the needed quantity of animal spirits to commit themselves 
to long-term investments in the age of speculation, and more a conviction 
that investors are less and less able to discover sufficient precedents for co-
ordinating their individual investment plans. In these circumstances, average 
expectation gains in significance at the expense of individual expectation, 
and investors accordingly reduce the extent of their commitments demanding 
prolonged neglect of average expectation. In effect, the historical develop-
ment of the investment process produces a structure or distribution of indi-
vidual expectations that is increasingly compact around average expectation. 
Yet note that because the possibility of profit (and loss) derives from pursu-
ing offers to buy and sell that depart from reigning prices, an investment 
activity increasingly compact around average expectation must as a whole 
become less profitable. This produces a chronic stagnation of investment 
expenditure which itself depresses aggregate demand. Put in terms of Key-
nes's important emphasis upon uncertainty, the increasing difficulty investors 
find in establishing a shared confidence regarding potential transactions re-
flects an increasing uncertainty regarding their expectations of one another. It 
is, therefore, not so much the essential indeterminac:y of the future that 
explains uncertainty (which, it should be emphasized, is no less a reality in 
times when investment is extensive), but rather the changed state of confi-
dence within the community of investors, who find it increasingly difficult to 
establish concordant expectations regarding transactions that depart from 
average expectation, that explains uncertainty. In this respect, it would be 
misleading to say that for Keynes uncertainty is an inescapable, existential 
dilemma. More appropriately, for Keynes uncertainty is chiefly a social rela-
tion; a social relation, moreover, that is tied to a specific history to which we 
must turn if we are to explain the state of activity of animal spirits, as 
reflected in Keynes's independent variables. 
Concluding comments 
The historical transition from the era of enterprise to the age of speculation, it 
might finally be noted, produces an ironic reversal in the relationships be-
tween individuals involved in the investment process. When business was a 
'way of life', individuals worked for extended periods for one firm. They 
were close to the fundamentals of firm operations, and detached from any 
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mass market psychology regarding long-term investment. This enabled them 
to disregard average expectation (to the extent that it was at all tangible in 
such an era), and project individual expectations regarding the firm's expan-
sion that had clear precedent for outside investors in lengthy involvement 
with firm operations. Moreover, the decision in a firm to offer equity shares 
or sell bonds was also the product of discussions between firm owners and 
managers that addressed just these fundamentals. Thus, though firms acted 
atomistically in investment markets in virtue of the unique character of their 
respective underlying fundamentals, they did so by establishing an internal 
shared confidence among themselves regarding their firm's individual invest-
ment expectations that constituted a precondition for the shared confidence 
established between the firm and its outside investors. 
In contrast, the separation of ownership and management that gave specu-
lative activity a predominant role in investment markets produces precisely 
the opposite state of affairs. When investors found that they must attend to 
the psychology of the market rather than to the underlying fundamentals of 
firm operations, they lost that atomistic relation to one another as buyers and 
sellers of investments that prevailed when ownership was united with man-
agement. At the same time, however, their detachment from firm fundamen-
tals made it increasingly difficult for investors to achieve a shared confidence 
over transactions at prices departing from average expectation. Removed 
from the setting of the firm, investors thus found themselves cast together in 
their common concern with average opinion, yet at the same time less able to 
reach agreements with one another that would potentially earn them profits. 
This changed horizon is important for understanding Keynes's long-term 
policy perspectives regarding investment, since these depend upon restoring 
the lost past balance between the private and public aspects of character in 
the investment process. 
In this reversal, then, we see Keynes's ultimate philosophical concern with 
the broad categories of individuality and sociality. The General Theory takes 
us beyond this framework as previously advanced in its incorporation of an 
understanding of the historical development in capital markets and the 
economy. On the broad philosophical level, Keynes's thinking requires a 
general explanation of the interrelated nature of individuality and sociality. 
On the historical plane, the way in which interdependent expectations link 
individuals together depends upon the institutions that exist in the economy. 
Keynes came to recognize this when he discovered the importance of con-
vention. In his earTy philosophical thinking, in contrast, individuality had 
been balanced by a commonality of human nature. However, Keynes came to 
believe this inadequate on account of his difficulties in explaining the play of 
intuition, and thus, as he insists in 'My Early Beliefs', determined that 
individuality was balanced by convention. The treatment of convention in 
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The General Theory, as a structure of interdependent individual expectations 
having average expectation as a point of reference, gives concrete expression 
to this balance. 
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